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POST CONSTITUTIONALISM
Lawrence Lessig*

CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT. By Robert C. Post. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 463. $45.
INTRODUCTION
There's one First Amendment, not a collection of first amendments. This one First Amendment has just fourteen words touching
free speech and freedom of the press, not a code of provisions, each
applying differently in separate spheres of social life. These fourteen words about speech and the press speak to us directly - with
apparent simplicity, limiting the sovereign's powers in ways plainly
established. Yet out of this one amendment, out of these fourteen
words, out of this simplicity, constitutional law has generated an
enormous complexity. No single principle explains its contours; no
simple set of ideas describes its reach. There is none of the tidiness
of the constitutional text - none of its directness.
We live in an age when this complexity has a certain cost. The
cost is instability. Nothing ties this complicated doctrine to a well
understood text; nothing cabins its principles to a manageable core.
The complexity is generative, and its generation continues. And
with this growth comes a growing impatience that after 200 years
it's not clear why there's more to discover. If we were really just
working it out, wouldn't we have gotten it by now?
Come then the theorists, with two sorts of replies. The first
looks for a principle, or set of principles, with which to explain and
justify this complicated array. The idea is to unify the doctrine
around a principled core, and the belief is that there will be this one
principle, or small set of principles, that can stand outside any particular First Amendment context, yet guide First Amendment inquiry in every First Amendment context. In this way is the
approach Rawlsian - not in substance but in form. 1 It is the
search for, as Frederick Schauer calls it, the "free speech principle"2
* B.A., B.S. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; M.A. Phil. 1986, Cambridge University;
J.D. 1989, Yale. - Ed. Funding provided by the Russell Baker Scholars Fund, and Sarah
Scaife Foundation. Thanks to Richard Craswell for comments on an earlier draft, and to
Ashley Charles Parrish for research assistance.
1. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE (1971) (presenting this fonn).
2. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
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- the project of Alexander Meiklejohn, and Martin Redish, and
Geoffrey Stone, and the work of a generation of constitutional law.
The second reply begins not in the sky, as it were, but on the
ground. It asks not what is the free speech principle, then to be
applied in every free speech context, but rather, what are the contexts within which the free speech principle applies, and how do
these contexts, and the free speech ideals within them, differ. In
political philosophy, it is the approach of Michael Walzer3 - asking
(about a theory of justice) not what is the principle of justice that
gets applied in each context of justice, but what are the principles of
justice inherent in the separate spheres within which justice questions get raised, how do they relate, and how do we draw boundaries between these separate spheres.
Robert Post4 is law's Michael Walzer. His aim is not to find the
free speech principle (p. 16). His aim instead is to understand the
principles inherent in separate domains of constitutional life, and
then to find a way to speak of, and integrate, these local principles.
His method is in part realist, and in part post-realist - realist in its
openness to the differences of social context, and its willingness to
use nonlegal material to understand the stuff law must regulate;
post-realist in its effort nonetheless to find a language within law
with which to understand the differences that this openness
reveals.5 There is only one First Amendment, but its meaning, Post
might say, depends upon these different domains of constitutional
life. The task of constitutional theory should be to understand how
to relate these different domains, by understanding the principles
inherent in each.
My intuitions are more Walzerian than Rawlsian, more Post
than Meiklejohn. I confess that theorizing about complexity just
strikes me as better than theorizing into simplicity. My aim in the
first part of this essay is to convince you of the same. I will speak as
a disciple, for my hope is to persuade that this way of understanding
constitutional law better understands, and better justifies, the law
that we have than do any of the alternatives. This is an important
book by one of America's foremost constitutional scholars; its
3. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (presenting this substance).
4. Robert Post is the Alexander F. & May T. Morrison Professor of Law at the University
of California at Berkeley School of Law.
5. As Post puts it:
American constitutional scholars of my generation inhabit the aftermath of legal realism. No longer for us can the law glow with an innocent and pristine autonomy; no
longer can it be seen to subsist in elegant and evolving patterns of doctrinal rules. Instead we naturally and inevitably read legal standards as pragmatic instrumel)ts of policy. We seek to use the law as a tool to accomplish social ends, and the essence of our
scholarly debate revolves around the question of what those ends ought to be.
P. 1.
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method is distinctive and its conclusions are rich. It should be at
the center of our thought about free speech in America.
In the second part I will be more skeptical. For there is a sanguinity to the account here that I do not share. Post writes as if he
has told a story that will let constitutional law sleep - an understanding of constitutional law that can make us comfortable with
what we are doing, recommitted to the task at hand. But I think the
story should disturb. This is not an account that will make constitutional law any easier; it is not an account that shows why constitutional law can function well within our interpretive context. It is
in~tead an account that will reveal just why constitutional law for us
remains so difficult. Post wants us to be post-realist in our approach,6 but what he teaches may make us post-constitutional
instead.
"Post-constitutional" means just this: Constitutionalism is that
practice of a constitutional culture where limits on the authority of
actors with power are enforced in the name of constitutional principle. In the United States, this enforcement is by a court, and here a
court's willingness, or eagerness, to act as a constitutional check
turns in large part upon the extent to which the court can appear
merely to be executing the constitution's command. Clarity, simplicity, and directness in a constitution translate into vigor. Constitutionalism in this sense requires a certain sort of vigor.
Post-constitutionalism has lost this. When constitutional commands don't appear clear, or when they rest transparently upon
contested, heated, nonlegal debate, courts are more reluctant. They
are reluctant to resolve disputes in these contested domains, because resolution of matters of contest seems within the domain of
the democratic branches. The effect of the contest then is to shift
questions from constitutional control to political control, from constitutionalism to democracy.1
Post rightfully, from the standpoint of truth, criticizes the clumsiness of free speech doctrine. He teaches us something about the
sociological facts underlying legal doctrine. He helps us see more
clearly the contest of ~tructures that present doctrine lets us ignore.
He has, in this powerful book, drawn back the curtain in a land of
constitutional Oz.
But what this understanding will do is not clear. For what it.
does most directly is reveal the contest of values that current doctrine covers with the label "neutral." This is realism brought to
First Amendment thought - the last bastion of liberal and formal
6. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375.
7. One fonn of this shift I describe as the "Erie·effect" in Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 426-38 {1995).
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constitutionalism. The question is whether the effect may well be
not to liberate First Amendment thought, as much as to kill First
Amendment constitutionalism. The question is whether postrealism moves us beyond constitutionalism.
I.

THE DOMAINS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

We live our lives in many places - in the family, at work, in a
public meeting, in the wilderness. These places have a certain logic,
not wholly exclusive, but separate nonetheless. This logic defines
what is appropriate in each place, sometimes it gives life in that
place a purpose, sometimes it simply sets off a range of purposes.
Walzer wrote of nine spheres of social life, each a place in the sense
that I have used.8 Post wants to speak more generally, though
about a narrower range of social life, by speaking of just three community, democracy, and management (p. 13).
These three define three modalities in an individual's life. They
define a kind of activity that goes on within each, and they suggest
the limits that each may exert over an individual's life. The task of
constitutional law, Post argues, is to make sense of constitutional
structures against the background of these three separate domains;
to develop a constitutional law that can respect the differences in
these domains, and sustain them. More particularly, the task of
First Amendment law must be to articulate a doctrine~ of free
speech law that is sensitive to the differences between these domains, and that helps ensure that the logic of one doesn't overrun
life in another.
But a constitutional theory must do more than describe; it must
also guide. An approach respectful of different domains of social
life must still provide lessons for resolving disputes at the borders.
Domains are never wholly separate. We never live in just one sta-.
ble place; and even when living in one place stably we are never
immune from the influence of other places, and other domains.
Domains, or spheres, are separate, but separate spheres bleed.
They influence neighboring domains, and distant domains. The
question is how, and whether, separate spheres are to be kept separate; how lines between them are to be drawn.
This was Ronald Dworkin's attack on Walzer.9 Dworkin argued
not only that the ideal of a theory of justice based on these multiple
spheres of justice was "not attainable," but also that it was "not
coherent." The project, Dworkin argued, of looking to social con8. See WALZER, supra note 3 (describing the spheres of membership, security and welfare, money and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, and
divine grace).
9. See Ronald Dworkin, To Each His Own, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 14, 1983, at 4 (reviewing WALZER, supra note 3).
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ventions to "discover appropriate principles of distribution" was
simply "not helpful." Social conventions - or in the terms we have
used, the logic dividing these separate domains - are inherently
contested; if it is the lines between them that are to regulate political debate, then these lines are always up for grabs. Nothing in this
multiplicity could provide guidance; worse, nothing in this multiplicity could assure justice. The project was both too radical since offering no useful guide - and not radical enough - since it
simply reflected existing social norms.
This is the challenge that any Walzerian must meet. The challenge has two parts: The first is whether multiplicity can actually
guide justice talk; the second is whether its guidance is anything
more than a path home to the status quo. Can this technique constrain decisionmakers to do what is just, and can it liberate social
contexts from injustice? These are (in part at least) empirical questions, and law is a structure for evaluating just how they work themselves out. For within law are institutions to adjudicate these
claims, and a practice of adjudication that is essentially Walzerian.
Law starts in a Walzerian world. Judges - not the most reflective
of our intellectual elite - come to legal questions fully clothed, as
it were, with the social understandings of these different social do- ·
mains. They have not been trained to cut away social context (the
picture Justice Thomas gave us of a justice "stripped down like a
runner" 10 is a~ implausible as it is weird); they do not work to abstract guiding and general social truth; they have been trained to
resolve problems taking these social understandings, in some sense,
for·granted. They just see the school as different from a newspaper,
the Internet different from cable news. Judges don't start with the
free speech principle; they start with an understanding of the social
contexts within which it is to apply, and apply it. Or as Post would
say, apply or "establish" or define them (pp. 2-3).
The Rawlsian might regret this. He might counsel the lawyer to
work quickly to abstract; he might say that the first task is to reflect
ourselves out of these particular places, and discover a more general rule. But the Walzerian, or (here we must switch finally to the
lead in this play) the Postian, wants to make use of this starting
point. He wants us to work from it, to understand a practice of free
speech that can respect, and sustain, and track, these separate domains of social life. "Like a chameleon," Post writes, the law must
"transform itself to mimic and enhance the social domains it establishes and sustains" (pp. 2-3).
The domains that Post describes, again, are community, democracy, and management. The names don't announce their meaning.
10. See Linda Greenhouse, In Trying To Clarify What He ls Not, Thomas Opens Question
of What He ls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at A19 (quoting Thomas's testimony).
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A little explanation is needed. I will consider them here in the order Post does, though my use of them will not be as balanced as his.
"Community" does not refer to Minot, North Dakota. It is not
meant to refer to some time in the past when most lived in small
towns with nosy neighbors. In the sense that Post intends, we all
live in communities. For community here means that place, or
those places, or that "form of social organization" (p. 180) where
our identity is in some sense defined, or constituted, by the nature,
or the structure, of those with whom we associate - a constitution
through this practice of association; an identity produced through
"connectedness." The community is that place, or those places,
where who I am is in some way constituted by those with whom I
associate. Not dictated, or determined (p. 182): the mechanisms of
the construction of this identity are too complex for anything so
simple, but influenced and directed and evolving "from forms of
social interaction" (p. 128). It is the place where who I am is made,
in part, by the associations that I make (p. 181). We all live in communities, in this sense, even though we don't all live in Minot.
Modernity therefore doesn't eliminate community; it simply
transforms it.11 Post doesn't say much about how "community" has
changed, or better, about how the institutions of community have
changed, but many of the differences are obvious. We live today in
more communities than before; these communities are not so much
geographically based; they are, for the most part, more voluntary
than status-driven; they are, for the most part, more private than
public. We associate more than have associations, meaning we
choose mqre what our associations will be, and more of who we are
is defined by this association. But whether chosen or not, these as:sociations still define who we are. I may have the choice today to
join a Catholic or Jewish congregation; but whichever I choose, if
this becomes a large part of my life, much that I don't choose.
(namely the structure of these communities) thereafter will define
me.
The domain of democracy has a different logic. In this place, I,
and others, collectively determine what our governments will be,
and to some extent, what our communities will be. Here is the
place where collective, and reflective, judgment is to occur, not at
the level of an individual's life, but at the level of a collective. Here
is where the rules get made, through a process of collective judgment about what the rules ought to be. The domain of democracy
is the place where one is critical, where one steps outside of a particular life, or of a particular community, into a life set upon thinking reflectively about how we should live (p. 80). No one lives in
11. For a sociological account of this transfonnation, see CLAUSES. FISCHER, To DWELL
(1982).

AMONG FRIENDS
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the domain of democracy; we go there, for a short period of time
perhaps, but long enough to look back on the place from where we
came. Put too simply, democracy is more than majoritarianism (p.
6); it is the place, free of comn;mnal constraints, where we choose
how community should constrain us.
And then there is the domain of management. This is the place
of instrumentality, where an individual becomes the means to
someone else's end - a cog in a machine, a tool for another's purposes, an object to be manipulated. Ghastly it is, the place where
alienation is to happen, where the categorical imperative is violated, where our hands are tom from our souls, where we become
someone else's, at least for a time. Ghastly, but quite ordinary. For
in measured doses, alienation is not all that bad. Kant, or Marx,
notwithstanding, we are all means at some time to someone else's
ends, and it's not all that bad. We are at times our lover's pillow,
yet love is not the worse for it. For limited times, when voluntarily
chosen, to an end that we believe in - when these are its conditions, management is acceptable. Management is that place where
we submit to instrumental structures of control, and while these
structures exercise a control over us that doesn't exist in other domains, the control they exercise is not, for that reason alone, inherently evil. It is indeed just another part of life.
Post's focus on the management domain is more limited than
this. For his concern is the management domain where government
is the manager. The question he wants to ask is how much the government, as manager, might demand. One might wonder more generally about the domain of management;12 but Post's focus is quite
particular. Indeed, the narrow focus here raises an important question about Post's strategy in general, a point that it is useful to flag
from the start.
These three domains are not exhaustive. We could imagine
others. There is, for example, the domain of dominance - a place
where a large number of humans live, subjected to a life of inequality or humiliation. This is a domain distinct from the domain of
management, for there is no social meaning of inequality inherent
in the domain of management. It is also distinct from community,
for again, nothing in the idea of community compels inequality. Or,
we might think of the domain of self-reflection, which, like the domain of democracy, is a place where critical reflection goes on, but
which, unlike the domain of democracy, is a reflection at the level
of the individual rather than the community. The domain of self12. So when Post writes "[t]he trend toward management compounds itself, because the
growing rationalization of society undermines cultural norms that might otherwise sustain the
alternative authority of community,'' this is just as applicable, one might think, to corporate
management as to governmental. P. 5. Yet this public-private distinction is adopted here
without any serious question.
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reflection has its own logic; we might describe its contours and its
limits; and these limits might matter to how we define the domain
of community, or democracy. But this domain too is not the subject
of Post's account.
Thus the domains that Post describes are selected for a particular end. They are not all the possible domains of social life; they are
those necessary to a very particular problem - namely, what is the
constitutional regime necessary to our self-government? This is not
a question asked in the abstract; he is asking it about us, and our
constitutional history. But he is exploring it only so far as is necessary to that relatively narrow social question. This is a subset of the
question that Walzer might discuss; but it is the set necessary to
understanding the constitutional problems put by the First
Amendment.
The book marches through these three domains, and its strategy
throughout is to use each to suggest how they together play out this
dynamic of reflective self-government.13 But throughout Post is
also battling the impatient skepticism voiced by Dworkin against
Walzer: Can this multiplicity provide guidance, and can it provide
guidance of a useful, meaning critically reflective, kind? 14
The answer is in the telling, and in the balance of this section, I
want to tell enough to give a sense of the structure of the account.
It is a mistake, I will argue, to believe that contestedness at the
borders means this plural account must fail. Post has demonstrated
well just how solid this mix can be. But what Post hasn't done is
identify a technique that will deal well with this conflict. This, however, is criticism, and this, with others, must await description. ·
Post begins with the domain of community. Community, as I
have described, is that place where the individual, through interaction, constructs, or realizes, or makes, her identity. Law helps construct this place. Not just law, but in part law, and Post's focus at
the start is on one way in which law helps construct that place.
Courts don't "merely thematize and incorporate ambient cultural
\

13.' The book actually begins with a chapter on constitutional interpretation, which I do
not intend to consider in any detail in the discussion that follows. In it Post outlines three
"distinct theories of interpretation": one attempts to implement the constitution through the
articulation of explicit doctrinal rules; the second follows original intent; and a "third ... is a
form of interpretation that reads the constitution in a manner designed to express the deepest contemporary purposes of the people." P. 29. This may miss a fourth approach, somewhere between the originalist and responsive: this is an approach that seeks to translate
original values into the current interpretive context, a strategy in part originalist, and in part
responsive, yet neither alone. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 218 (1980); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995)
(describing and applying the practice of translation).
14. See Dworkin, supra note 9, at 4.
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norms . . . . Instead courts must themselves display those norms"
(p. 18).
His focus is the protection of privacy - first, through the tort of
intrusion, and second, through the tort of disclosure. It might seem
odd that a cause of action in tort would be a tool for constructing
community - in particular, this cause of action. The tort of privacy
is a right that an individual has not to be messed with in a particular
way. One might think it a paradigm of individualism, rather than
communalism. It is how the individual draws fences around his life,
or a device with which she may defend these fences. 1s So how then
does it have a role in making community?
The key is this: while the tort protects an individual, the fences
that it respects are fences collectively drawn. The tort doesn't remedy any subjective injury; it remedies injuries considered by the
community to be intrusions. Indeed, it gives this remedy whether
the individual considers the intrusion an intrusion at all. Fences
here are built by the tort, not by the victim; they reflect the community's judgment about what is properly private, not the individual's.
The tort constructs a space of appropriate privacy, and defends the
individual against invasions of that space (p. 54). But it defends the
individual not so much because the harm to the individual is so critical. Indeed, the tort survives even if there was no harm to the individual (p. 56). The tort puts the affirmation of the state behind the
idea that this space is properly private (p. 73), that it is inappropriate, a violation, wrong, shameful, for someone to cross such a line.
It is the state saying what is right or wrong in matters of individual
dignity. It is the force of the state behind a particular conception of
the good.
The law's role here is constitutive of a certain kind of community. It builds this community by defining a certain kind of civility
- again, just one part of the norms of civility, and no doubt a small
part (p. 65). At the edges, Post wants us to think, the state comes in
and defines the extremes. The state does not enforce all such rules
of civility. Most get enforced without the intervention of the state.
Most, that is, get enforced through a kind of social pressure - a
shaming, or stigma - that functions well enough without the power
of the state. But at the extremes, the state intervenes. At the extremes, the civility rules of tort step in to enforce the minimum that
the community demands.
Civility norms define what kind of community a community is; a
community is inherently a normative place, so civility norms are
used to define a certain normative order. The state then, to the
extent that it enforces these norms, is enforcing a certain kind of
15. Cf. OsCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SoRr.
SONAL INFORMATION 190 (1993).

A
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normative order. It does this by giving individuals a cause of action
that punishes those who violate this normative order (p. 58); but
what guides the application of this tool is an objective, not subjective, harm (p. 134).
The same account applies to the second privacy tort that Post
describes - the tort of disclosure. Here the story is a bit more
complex, though the underlying structure is the same. The law protects the individual against the wrongful disclosure of certain facts
about that individual. But it selects these facts not by calibrating
some subjective measure of harm suffered by the individual. The
law protects the individual when the disclosure is of the kind that
the law considers wrongful. The law calls this "offensive" disclosure, but offensiveness here is just a reflection of this objective standard. It is the construction, and support, that is, of a public
conception of appropriateness; not, like most torts, simply a tool for
remedying private wrongs. But unlike the tort of intrusion, the tort
of public disclosure has an escape valve. Some disclosures, however
harmful to the individual, will be allowed if they are about a "legitimate public concern." Obviously, in defining what is a legitimate
public concern, we are defining a contour of community.
This is the kernel of the idea that eventually blossomed into the
New York Times doctrine16 - an idea protecting certain disclosures
in the name of a greater public interest in that disclosure. Certain
speech must be allowed, regardless of its harm to an individual, because of its benefit to society. Harm is not eliminated; the burden
of the harm is just shifted.17 When matters are within the immunity
of the New York Times doctrine, the burden must fall on the victim;
when they are outside it, it falls on the perpetrator. It is a law
against theft, with a Robin Hood defense if the perpetrator splits
the profits with the state.
If New York Times were just about competing interests, or economic interests, then these immunities would make no sense - at
least as a constitutional claim. If all that were at issue were competing economic interests, then there would be no more reason to privilege the interest of the public against the interests of the private
than there would be to privilege the interests of the private against
the claims of the public. In either case, in a post-New Deal constitution, we would, or should, simply leave this conflict of interests to
the legislative process.
But there is more here than a conflict of interests. Indeed, just
as Post shows that neither tort is really much about protecting private interests - both, that is, are better understood as protecting a
public structure of civility - so too is the immunity from these ci16. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 CoLuM. L.

REV.

1321 (1992).
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vility rules not so much about protecting those causing this particular harm as it is about constructing a certain kind of public space.
This is the public space of accountability: a place where individuals
must answer for their actions in the eyes of others (p. 19). The conflict between the individual interests and the interests of the community, then, must get resolved, again, through a conception of the
community.
There is a technique here that is important, and general. The
technique is to see in the common law something other than what a
laissez-faire conception of the common law might teach. By both
the enemies, and friends, of the common law, we have been trained
to see in the common law either the protection of the individual
against the state, or the protection of the individual against another.
But such divides are too simple. The common law in its protections
of the individual also defined a certain kind of community. It was a
tool for constructing a certain community (p. 61). Post's method
helps us to see this construction, and his method extends quite easily outside the boundaries of tort.
To contract, for example. Indeed Post's point might be made
more strongly in the context of contract, for contract seems even
more removed from the domain of community; more than tort, contract appears to us a sphere of individual power, removed from the
concerns of community. In the rhetoric of the nineteenth-century
understanding of the doctrine, here more than anywhere was the
place of individual autonomy, and individual power. Contract was
the world where individuals made their own law; where, through
agreement, they could bind themselves, and subject themselves to
the power of the state; but where without agreement, they were
free from the coercion of the state.
Consider then the doctrine of reliance.is For much of the history of the nineteenth century, there was no enforceable doctrine of
reliance in contract law. A promise was enforceable if it was supported by consideration - something given in exchange for the
promise, and given because of the promise. Reliance on the promise alone could not make the promise enforceable.
18. The following account is drawn from three sources: Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of
Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373, 1375-88; Robert W. Gordon,
Macaulay, Macnei~ and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 565, 568-69; Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and the
Evolution of Contract Law, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 139, 194-206 (1980). My colleague Richard
Craswell warns me here that I am entering a debate about the evolution of contract doctrine
that may be beyond the point of this essay. In particular, he suggests that contract law itself
was enforcing contracts with consideration according to existing social norms as much as with
the doctrine of reliance, and that for my point, I don't need to make the extra claim that this
normative bite comes through reliance doctrine alone. I agree with his point, and mean to
point to reliance doctrine here just because it is so rich in the rhetoric of social meaning, not
because only it has that rhetoric. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, L.R. 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919),
reprinted in FRIEDRICH KEsSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS 116-18 (3d ed. 1986).
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At least in a court of law. But law is not the only normative
authority within a community. Social norms also exist. These
might well regulate the fickle promiser. The fickle promiser might
suffer, in this well-integrated community, stigma or shame from
leading another on through his word and then not carrying out what
his word promised.
This social mechanism might be quite effective, and subtle.
Under some circumstances, it might well succeed in making harmful
promising relatively infrequent. But at a certain stage, it might also
disappear. As individuals within that community become more
anonymous, or as the community becomes more heterogeneous, social mechanisms for disciplining inappropriate promising behavior
give out.19 If such behavior is to continue to be regulated, some
other mechanism must replace the failing social mechanisms.
Enter the law. For as plainly as any doctrine in contract law, the
reliance doctrine is a tool with which courts get to say what promising behavior is inappropriate, or appropriate. By enforcing
promises that induced justifiable reliance, the court gets to punish
inappropriate promising behavior, while leaving appropriate promising behavior alone. Law then replaces failed social mechanisms,
mechanisms that before may have disciplined the same behavior,
but that now don't. Law enters with all the good intentions of the
state child welfare system, and with perhaps just about as much
success.20
It is the sport of first-year contracts to make fun of these efforts
at making reliance enforceable. But if one can get beyond the
sport, one sees in the opinions just what Post wants us to see in the
judgments about privacy: one sees a claim about what is appropriate promising, or contracting, behavior; a claim about how people
are to behave. The function that this doctrine plays, no less than
the doctrine of privacy, is to define how people like us are to behave;21 and to punish those who don't live up to those standards of
civility. Perhaps more interestingly than tort, what we can observe
in contract law is the law's replacing social norms, just when we
might expect social norms to be giving out. The common law acts
to buttress norms that before may have been supported by reputa19. See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN
AMERICA (1993) {describing the rise of surveillance techniques).
20. Cf. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 186-93 (1996) (discussing the effect of
legal rules on nonns within families).
21. The examples from contract Jaw are here many. See, e.g., Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng.
Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852) (stating why the court should impose liability on the Gennan defendants in the case: "The exercise of this jurisdiction has, I believe, had a wholesome tendency towards the maintenance of that good faith which exists in this country to a much
greater degree perhaps than in any other").
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tion or practice, but that now, because of growing anonymity or
heterogeneity, cannot be supported except by law.
The law enters in contract then, just as with tort, with an expressive function. 22 Far more than the significance of the particular
case, it enters to say something about what kind of contracting behavior will be respected, and what kinds not. It acts as a way of
defining proper relations among members of a particular
community.
This is the point of Post's first move: to get us to see the community in what we would ordinarily think of as the individual - to
see the community in tort, or contract, where before we would see
the law as simply serving individual interests. The aim in emphasizing this collective is twofold: One part is to remind us of the role
that these communities here play; the second is to make more stark
a conflict that this role entails. For as romantic or nostalgic as a
picture of community might be, it pulls against another part of who
we are now. Whatever the place that this community has, we also
understand that it doesn't define us fully, or more importantly, that
no one community defines us fully. We are each individually constituted by more than one community; and we are collectively constituted by more than one community. No single community speaks
for us as individuals, and no single community represents us as a
political society.
This raises the problem of limits. For as important as community may be in defining who an individual is, no single community
can gain complete control over the definition of an individual. 'I\vo
kinds of space compete with community: First, space must be preserved for individual autonomy; and second, space must be assured
for the competition among communities. It is this second point that
focuses Post's second pass at the problem, in a chapter titled "Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the
First Amendment." If there are communities within which we are
constituted, then there is more than one community within which
we are so constituted. The problem that community talk presents
then is how to understand this multiplicity.
Here Post introduces a second trilogy of ideas, describing three
ways of working this conflict of communities (p. 90). Or better,
three ways of dealing with diversity within a community. The first
is the technique of assimilationism - where one communal form
enforces its conception of community upon all else. The second is
the technique of pluralism, where the effort is to protect competing
cultural forms from domination by any other. The third is the technique of individualism, which cares not at all about particular cul22. For an application in criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, 1lvo
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
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tural forms, but only ·about protecting the individual against the
coercive enforcement of any particular cultural form upon him.
Post illustrates these three attitudes in an extraordinarily rich
discussion of, of all things, blasphemy law. He begins with blasphemy law in England, which itself began firmly rooted in an
assimilationist tradition. Anyone questioning the truth of Christianity was subject to the savage punishments of this regime (p. 95).
Questioning the revealed truth of Christianity was a proxy for a
more general moral turpitude, which, the state of England viewed,
opened one up to proper punishment.
This is a quaint story about old England. What makes it fascinating is that the law of blasphemy continues in England to the
present day. In 1977, for example, a gay journal was prosecuted for
blasphemy, for questioning the Church's teachings with respect to
homosexuality.23 The House of Lords upheld the conviction, but
the central opinion, Post argues, was not assimilationist (p. 98). As
Lord Scarman describes, what constitutes the wrong is not the questioning of the doctrine of Christianity; the wrong is questioning the
doctrine in the wrong way (p. 100). What makes some speech blasphemy is that it questions another's religion in an insulting or extreme manner, not that it simply questions another's religion. So
understood, blasphemy law would protect not just the dominant
culture's religion, but also every other religion. Here the founding
value is no longer the dominant culture's, but rather a founding
value of toleration. Here the competition among communities is
resolved by the state preserving a certain peace among the combatants, by punishing those who insult another's community (p. 98).
America is not this culture of .toleration, however. America,
that is, does not solve this problem of competing communities by
protecting each community against the insult of another. Instead,
America is the culture of individualism. Rather than the neutrality
of peace among the combatants, the American strategy is to preserve the right of any individual to criticize anyone at all. The state
stands neutral here not by protecting the group against harm, but
by protecting the individual against state-imposed punishment.24
The American approach is represented in the case of Cantwell v.
Connecticut. 25 Post begins by reminding us that though the First
Amendment has been around since 1791, and though identically
worded state constitutional provisions have been on the books since
an earlier date, blasphemy has been a crime throughout America
23. See Regina v. Lemon, 1979 App. Cas. 617, 660 (Lord Scarrnan).
24. There is something a bit odd about this notion of neutrality when it is compared with
an equivalent notion about property. Imagine that the state said it was being neutral with
respect to distributions of property by refusing to coerce those who steal from others.
25. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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up until just twenty years ago (p.102). Not until Cantwell do we get
a very clear picture of just why blasphemy laws can no longer be
enforced in the American context: Toleration, Cantwell says, cannot constitutionally be enforced. An individual must have the right
to question and attack a form of community, even a religious community, in whatever form he sees fit. For the right of the speaker is
the right protected by the First Amendment (p. 104); and that right
cannot yield to any conception of group interest protected by a
principle of toleration. In America, free speech means the right of
the individual to be free to attack groups, to use that attack to help
reconstruct new groups (p. 105).
The state will not be used to punish, through the force of law,
any who might attack another group; that group must sustain itself
through voluntary action, if it sustains itself at all (p. 138). The picture here is that a community gets made, if at all, through the voluntary action of individuals.
This assumption about how community gets made - this picture of individuals reconstituting community - is a claim I return
to in the section that follows. The assumption provides a transition
between the first and second sections of the book - the transition
from community to democracy. The first section is about how community is normative in the life of the individual, the second section,
about democracy, is about how the individual must be protected
from the community's normativity if he is to function properly
within the democratic sphere. Democracy is the place where critical collective reflection goes on, and the question for constitutionalism is how much immunity the Constitution must grant to assure
that this reflection can properly occur.
Now again, the sense of "democracy" here is a bit counter-intuitive. Democracy does not refer to the processes or substance of
collective deliberation. It refers to what we might call the necessary
immunities that individuals must have to participate in this practice
of democracy. From what do individuals have to remain free in order to be properly free citizens within a democratic system? How
free must individuals be from norms of civility so as to maintain
space for public deliberation?
Post introduces the question with a classic First Amendment
conflict, Hustler v. Falwell. 26 Hustler had satirized Jerry Falwell,
and his mother, in a nationally published pornographic magazine.
The satire was by cartoon. No one could view the cartoon as
"civil"; it was repulsive even from the perspective of those who
least admire Falwell. But it was incivility directed against a public
figure, and hence within the ambit of the New York Times doctrine.
26. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Falwell tried to avoid the application of New York Times, by
arguing that this cartoon was an intentional infliction of emotional
distress. His gambit was thus to avoid the free speech doctrines all
together, and embrace instead what Post calls the civility norms of
the common law (p. 127). Any community requires civility norms;
this publication ignored all of them.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the newly-Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed the Virginia court's finding of liability against
Hustler. The mandate of the First Amendment, the Court held, was
to facilitate the free flow of ideas and opinion on matters of public
interest and concem.27 This mandate would run against rules directly regulating speech as well as rules indirectly regulating speech,
such as the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This
protection, the Court held, did not depend upon the motivation of
the speaker; it existed not just because it was opinion, but also because it was the attack of a public figure. 28 Moreover, the protection was absolute because any other protection, relying upon a
judgment of "outrageousness," would depend upon factors that are
"inherently subjective."29 The "inherently subjective" is not the
business of the state.
There was a certain drama to the Hustler opinion, on the surface
a ringing ACLU-ish endorsement of the First Amendment by a new
conservative Chief Justice. But it didn't take much to see that the
opinion couldn't really be taken seriously as a staterp.ent of constitutional principle. For the principle had no limit. In its absolutism,
it wipes away precisely what Post defends as the state's place in
constructing community. If the attempt to define norms of "outrageousness" was too subjective, what justified this effort of communities more generally?
Hustler is the rejection of defamation law's foundations. Defamation in the common law tradition had a twin origin. It began
both as a criminal action, and also as a civil action (p. 129). Truth
was a defense only in the civil action, which meant that the criminal
action was concerned only with assuring that speech didn't invade
dignity interests, whether true or not (p. 130). Some things could
not be said in the common law regime, because saying them was not
considered civil.
The function of this criminal regime then was public, not private. It was about maintaining a certain kind of public discourse;
about maintaining a certain civility within this public discourse.
The civil regime was different. It was designed more to compensate
for wrongful accusations. Truth, therefore, was relevant to this de27. See 485 U.S. at 50.
28. See 485 U.S. at 51.
29. See 485 U.S. at 55.
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termination. So that the defamed who was defamed with the truth
could gain no private gain from this defamation. The only action
for such a victim was the public action.
Post recounts the slow evolution of the common law to merge
these two actions. The first Restatement, for example, replicated the
distinction between civil and criminal by creating one tort, focused
on civility, and another, focused on false statements.30 In 1974,
"ridicule" was added to the Restatement, further refining the civility
notion.31 Speech that was essentially ridicule, .that was essentially
uncivil, would not, under this regime, gain constitutional protection.
This evolution was terminated, however, the very same year. In
1974, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,32 the Supreme Court definitively shifted the tort to a concern for truth alone. The only speech
that could, constitutionally, be proscribed was false speech; ridicule
when based upon opinion was constitutionally protected (p. 131).
This clear extermination of civility notions within defamation
forced the displacement of the values protected by that tort to other
torts - in particular, the privacy tort, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In both torts, now "outrageousness" replaced
ridicule; the question was whether the behavior, though speech behavior, was so outrageous as to violate norms of civility thought
fundamental (p. 129).
Hustler brings Gertz to this displaced civility tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Now here as well, even with speech
behavior deemed outrageous, no proscription through law can be
permitted constitutionally. We must stand by and let the market
control this vileness. Why? The Court's account is almost Borkish:
it is that any effort to proscribe the "outrageous" would be too unprincipled, too "subjective," for law.33 But if Post is to follow Hustler, he can't follow it for reasons like these. Post can't reject these
reasons because they are "subjective." Indeed, the great strength of
Post's work is to show the space between the subjective and the
objective within constitutional thought. What defines community
standards is neither the objective nor subjective; what defines community standards is a particular judgment of a community - local,
so not objective; collective, so not subjective (p. 134).
Post then needs a different account to make sense of the constitutional protection granted to "public discourse." Public discourse,
as Post defines it, is a discourse that "encompass[es] the communi30. See George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
75 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1625-28 (1977).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 567A (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND.
L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
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cative processes necessary for the formation of public opinion"
(p. 302). Stated most abstractly, his argument is this. Speech
deemed within the realm of "public discourse" may be subject to
neither norms of the community domain nor norms of the managerial domain. Instead, such speech must be free of collective norms
generally. For this speech, the individual must be granted a constitutional immunity; she must be left free from state coercion.
Post is describing the necessary space for critical thought. Life is
about - the metaphors here are endless - moving between living
and thinking critically about how we should live; it is about acting
on the stage, and then stepping off the stage to think about how life
on the stage should proceed. When one is in this critical mode, it
makes no sense that the norms of the life one is thinking critically
about should limit the ability to think critically. Here, in this space
for critical thought, and action, one must be free of these norms. It
follows that the norms of community that otherwise define one's
life must be, in a sense, shut off when one is thinking about how one
should live one's life.
This picture of reflection is everywhere in critical thought. It
has a naYve version, and a not-so-naYve version. The naYve version
is expressed by a regret in a novel by Milan Kundera.34 Says
Kundera:
We can never know what to want, because, living only one life, we can
neither compare it with our previous lives nor perfect it in our lives to
come.... There is no means of testing which decision is better, because there is no basis for comparison. We live everything as it
comes, without warning, like an actor going on cold.35

But who would do the picking among these various lives? Which is
the person who gets to live all the other lives, and then choose the
life that is best? For choice is made within a life, and if the person
selecting the life is without all lives, then he has nothing with which
to make this choice. Likewise with the space within which one
stands when one is critical about life within community: One does
not stand outside any community; one is not free of all normative
judgments; one is not defined as the person who has no life. That
person could not reflect on life within a community, because, like
the character in Kundera's novel, that person would have no life
with which to make this reflection.
The not-so-naYve version is thus more limited. Public discourse,
under this version, is a place where the individual can say what he
or she wants, without fear of government censorship, or direct punishment for views expressed. The immunity that democracy must
34. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 8 (Michael Henry Heim
trans., 1984).
35. Id.
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provide is against one kind of punishment only. It is not an immunity from every sort of punishment, or every form of life. The community may properly hate your ideas; they just may not lock you up
for them.
Public discourse is thus an importantly limited critical practice.
It is limited first because the thing it is directed most firmly against
- state censorship - may in this world be quite a tiny danger.
Second, the thing it ignores when granting this immunity - social
sanction - is really quite great. Compare two techniques for regulating pornography: one that bans the sale and distribution of pornography, the other that publishes the names of consumers of
pornography.36 It is not plain that the first is a more effective technique for regulating pornography than the second. Yet only one is
on the First Amendment's screen.
In the second part of this essay, I want to return to this point
about the limits of this principle against censorship. My point here
is just to emphasize the smallness of the space that this public discourse model wants to open up. The idea is that we must immunize
individuals in their effort to attack existing structures, so that communities are formed from the voluntary associations that these attacks may produce. There is, Post says, a marketplace of
community. Within this marketplace, individuals compete to form,
and reform, social groups. Law, within this marketplace, must remain neutral among the many groups that may get made. Neutral
then means not interfering with private power.37
Post is describing a balance, not a foundation. He is giving a
reason why one kind of punishment may not be applied to speech,
but he is not giving an argument why all norms of civility should be
displaced. Indeed, the richness of his account here is just its appreciation of the tension between this principle of public discourse and
the construction of community. This is a tension that cannot be
avoided, and that de.fines, as he describes it, the paradox of public
discourse: public discourse must "blunt" rules of civility if it is to
assure a critical space within which reflection about community life
can occur (p. 301). Yet if it blunts these rules of civility too much, it
will undercut the very community that it criticizes. Once again we
have a tension that cannot and should not be resolved. It is a tension that must be sustained, between open space for speech, and a
closed space for building the conditions of a community.
The domain of democracy is about a limit on the scope of community, it is about when norms of community must be suspended so
36. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
37. Again, compare this point with the same point made, supra note 24, about the state's
power vis-a-vis property.
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that a critical space may be preserved. This is the very same question raised in the third section of Post's book, describing the management domain (pp. 197-289). But here the norms are
instrumental, not constitutive. Just as there is a domain, the domain
of community, where norms of a community operate to coerce an
individual into being a certain sort, so too is there a domain, the
domain of management, where instrumental norms coerce an individual into doing things of a certain sort. These are both places
where the individual is, for these different reasons, not free; and
they are both domains that, because of both kinds of unfreedom,
must, in principled ways, be limited. Stalinist Russia was a place
where people lived exclusively within the domain of management.
An Amish village is a place where people live exclusively within the
domain of community. We live in a place where people move
among all three, and the question for constitutional law is how to
draw the boundaries to preserve all three.
Post describes two contexts within which the limits of the domain of management get raised - the first, the public forum doctrine; the second, the scope of "collectivist" free speech doctrine
(pp. 199, 268). I will discuss only the first at any length.
The question for public forum doctrine is just this. There are
places that the government owns. It regulates access to them, it
determines the activities that occur within them. The public forum
doctrine asks whether there are limits on this power of governmental control.
The pattern of the solution should now be familiar. Post asks us
first to discriminate - to distinguish the ends to which governmental regulation in a public forum is a means. If the ends are managerial, if they are directed at legitimately managing objects properly
within the government's domain, then the First Amendment limits
on the government's techniques should be small. If the ends are
not managerial, if the speech is speech about governance, then the
First Amendment limitations on the government's power should be
great (pp. 237, 245).
Post's analysis parallels the "Court's decisions dealing with the
internal management of speech" (p. 244). The question is: What
are the limits on the government's ability to manage the expression
of the people it employs? In both contexts, the question is about
how the government's power should be limited, given the competing interests of the public space. In both contexts, the analysis is
just the mirror image of the one 'used to answer the ·same' questions
asked about the scope of community norms.
The answer in both cases looks to the proper managerial role
being served by the government institution, and to whether the regulation at issue reasonably serves this regulative role (p. 245). This
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is different from the Grayned3S approach, which asks simply what is
the government's interest in regulating the speech at issue, and
whether that interest gets outweighed by the speakers' interest. It
is different because it is not thinking about these interests in the
abstract; it is placing them within particular institutional structures.
Within those institutional structures, the question is what sort of
end the speech restriction serves. If it is a properly managerial end,
then the institution gets a form of deference in its judgment about
the scope of the speech restriction, if indeed granting deference is
an appropriate, or necessary, feature of this institution.
The approach here just patterns the approach in the second section of the book. For just as there the question was how much
space must the individual have vis-a-vis the community, here the
question is how much space must the individual have vis-a-vis the
government-as-manager. What is driving both is a competing vision
of a properly regulated domain - whether community or management - and the proper space to be left open from that domain where the individual cannot be made subject to the commands of
the regulated domain. Again, what is sustaining the conflict is the
notion that neither domain can be eliminated: both must sustain
themselves, this tension notwithstanding. The necessity of this tension, the way in which it sustains the lives it opposes, the richness it
allows - this is the lesson Post wants to teach.

* * *
There's a place in cyberspace called LamdaMOO - a MOO, or
a MUD, one of thousands of MUDs in cyberspace, places where
people play out roles, or games, where they define their own characters, and environments that, because played in a virtual world,
stick.39 A person enters LamdaMOO however he wishes, as a man,
or a woman, or a fish; with an attitude, or a question, or a longing;
with a purpose, or just wandering; for a short time, or for years.
What happens in this virtual space is what happens in real space,
but this virtual space is much more plastic than the real world for again, who one is is subject to definition; and the world one
plays in is subject to manipulation. One can design oneself to be a
cat, and then design this cat such that if a bird flies into the room,
the cat will meow. This cat that meows, then, interacts with others
in this space - which means talks with others, or walks with others,
or flirts.
38. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
39. MUD stands for a "Multiuser Dungeon;" a MOO is a "MUD, Object Oriented." See
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1747 n.11 (1995). LamdaMOO
is well-described in Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 21, 1993, at
36.
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It is slowly becoming impossible to ignore these places of cyberspace. What they are doing to individuals who live in them is extraordinary, yet largely unknown.4 o They are engines of
multiplicity, and maybe duplicity; machines that facilitate the living
of many lives. And unlike the many lives that most in modem society live all the time - awaking a lover, making breakfast as a
mother, racing to work as a lawyer, etc. - this multiplicity occurs
simultaneously. On one screen one can have many windows, and in
each window, one can play a different character. As one male
player describes it:
I split my mind. I'm getting better at it. I can see myself as being two
or three or more. And I just turn on one part of my mind and then
another when I go from window to window. I'm in some kind of argument in one window, and trying to come on to a girl in a MUD in
another, and another window might be running a spreadsheet program .... [Real Life] is just one more window and it's not usually my
best one.41

Whatever else this amazingly bizarre world does, it does help us
see something that is central to the argument that Post presents.
First, it helps us see life within this community. For however odd,
or frightening, one imagines that the life of these MUDers is, it is
plain that what they do in this elaborate game is construct an identity and a society through extensive interaction over time. They
build, that is, a community. They may choose who they are as they
enter the MUD, but over time who they are gains a kind of social
capital. They gain this capital through extensive conversation with
others in this space. Indeed for many, this is the closest contact
they have with others in a community. The games have logic; the
players play subject to that logic; they play over times, and through
time, that logic, and who they have been, sink in. One becomes
that person, however one becomes a person, that one plays in
cyberspace; his identity is in some way linked to the character.
But this community also helps us see two other critical parts to
Post's account, one implied, one express. The implied is the place
for the individual, independent of these roles, and here the technology magnifies the sense in which we imagine, or hope, that an individual is something other than what these communities define.
There is a person separate from the character(s) he or she plays.
Not wholly separate - we might worry about what the games do to
the person in real life, and we might hope that the person in real life
(RL) has some effect on the people in the games - but separate
enough.
40. For an exceptional first "introduction, see
(1995).
41. Id. at 13.

SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN
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The express part in Post's account is the place for democracy,
and here is where LamdaMOO becames so instructive. For as well
as there being individuals outside the games, there is a collective
outside of the games. The collective is all those who play the
games, and they became a collective in the sense Post means when
they deliberate collectively about how life in the MOO shall
proceed.
In LamdaMOO, such. a _collective exists. After a particularly
evil sort did a grossly awful thing to a number of people in a living
room one night,42 the Wizards of LamdaMOO built democracy into
the world of LamdaMOO. This was a space - call it a domain where people discuss propositions for regulating this community.
These propositions are voted upon, through an extensive balloting
process, and these ballots then determine life in the community.
The link to Post here is this: that when one is in this place where
democracy is the rule, one is outside the particular communities
that one has up to then been living. One can step outside one's
character to debate what rules should collectively govern these
communities; no game can tie one up so that one is silent in this
public space.
The game-playing stops, then, in two very different ways. One is
when a person leaves the space to return to RL; the other is when
one leaves the game, to discuss what rules should govern the space
generally. When one leaves for RL, one returns an individual;
when one leaves for the discussion, one begins a process of collective deliberation.43
Though few have lived it, I suggest that our intuitions are welltrained in a case like this. I think we all see the need to preserve
this balance of spaces - the need to preserve either the retreat to
an individual space, or the advance to a collective space where rules
of the MUD get· made. The question is how much of these two
kinds of escapes there must be to assure that this middle place
doesn't get out of control.
This is the balance that Post is pointing us to, I suggest, in two
different ways. In the one way, it is about the relationship among
the individual, community, and democracy. In the second, it is
about the relationship among the individual, management, and democracy. These are precisely parallel problems, both about how
much this middle domain - community and management should be allowed to control an individual, and the collective made
up of these individuals. The community is one space where individuals live; it is a space where the individual must be free to some
42. Described in Dibbell, supra note 39.
43. Cf. p. 7 ("The essential problematic of democracy thus lies in the reconciliation of
individual and collective autonomy.").
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extent to determine whether this community is where she wants to
live; and the community must be free, to some extent, of the constraints of the community to determine whether this community is
how the community wants it to be. Thus the pull of the individual
space and democracy at both ends of community.
The same pull exists in the domain of management, for management, like community, is a structure for controlling individual and
communal life. It must be left open for the individual to question
his participation in this structure, and left open for the community
to question the structure itself. Its tensions, though in substance
different, are in form the same as community tensions, and the tensions of LamdaMOO. The practice for resolving them is the general practice that Post has displayed. And described. And
recommends.
II.

QUESTIONS

My aim in the first part was to describe. My purpose here is to
question. I focus on four questions, moving from the less significant
to the more. These are not limits of one author; they are limits of a
constitutional culture. For again, my view is that the practice Post
has described is the best that constitutional law can be; but it may
well be that constitutional law cannot be very much. At least for us,
at least just now.
A. How To Defend Borders
Running throughout this book is the idea of multiplicity over
unity. That we should see the differences in the contexts within
which First Amendment norms must apply, rather than speaking as.
if all were the same. That w&-should understand the different forms
of life necessary to sustain democratic self-government, and build a
regime that can support these differences. There may be just one
First Amendment, but we need a rich understanding of that amendment to help us navigate these different domains of social life.
The hard question is drawing the boundaries - finding a way
convincingly to place one sort of activity within one domain, and to
distinguish it from activities in another. Post's aim is to focus on
this "largely unappreciated struggle[ ] ... about how the boundaries
between distinct realms are to be fixed" (p. 2). But the focus is on
techniques for a court. It is a court that will make the distinctions
that this richer theory demands. A question then might be whether
the tools that Post provides give courts the capacity to so
distinguish.
In Post's view, this challenge is a difficult one. The problem
with courts is that they are too thick-thumbed .about the matter.
The pattern is familiar: academics give the Court a fairly rich
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model for understanding, and applying, First Amendment doctrine;
the Court selects a fairly clumsy and crude model instead.
Public forum doctrine is a good example. Public forum doctrine
gets born in an ambiguity. Both in its founding opinion, Hague, 44
and in its announcing law review article by Harry Kalven,45 it is
never quite clear whether what makes something a public forum and hence a place where the government's ability to manage speech
is constrained - is something about the property itself, or something about the nature of the government's interest in regulating
speech within that property. The theoretically unrespectable position is the position that makes this turn on something about the
property itself - whether, for example, it has always been dedicated to the public, or whether it is a street, or park, or any other
such contingent and theoretically irrelevant fact. The theoretically
respectable position is the latter position - that the status turns on
something in the nature of the government's interest in regulating
speech. In line with this respectable position, at least one Supreme
Court case articulated a fairly respectable test: As the Court said in
Grayned, the question has nothing to do with the kind of governmental property at issue (p. 209); it is simply that if government
property is at issue, then the government must show that its interest
in regulating the speech outweighs the burden the regulation imposes on the speech. An exercise of power to silence then must
always be based on a justification referring to the nature of the government interest.
Post likes neither approach. He doesn't like the "kinds of property" approach because it is a conclusion in search of a theory. He
doesn't like the Grayned approach because it is not sufficiently respectful of the proper management role that government might
have within a properly managerial domain. As I described before,
in Post's view, the question is whether the speech restriction is necessary to a legitimate governmental purpose; and if it is, then courts
should defer to that decision, to ensure that authority is maintained
where authority is necessary.
With this I agree. The problem is in the next step. For from the
fact that Post has identified what is plausibly a better account of and
justification for existing public forum doctrine cases, he wants to
infer that public forum doctrine should now be reconceived explicitly along these lines. Once we know the contours of the constitutional doctrine, he says, we should adopt a constitutional approach
that makes those contours clear. Rather than this collection of
crude approximations at a constitutional theory, we should embrace
44. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
45. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum· Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT.
REV. 1.
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an approach that explicitly recognizes the constitutional values at
stake, and determines them (p. 17).
It is this step that I think we must pause upon. For it has within
it an assumption that is common within constitutional theory and, I
suggest, commonly wrong. This is the assumption that transparency
is costless; that direction always trumps indirection; that the best
way to deal with conflict and ambiguity is openness, and honesty;
that struggles are best on the surf(l_ce.. ,
These may be good maxims for life, or maybe for love. I want
to suggest that we think more carefully about whether they make
much sense when applied to the work of the Court. Post's theory
shows us that the lines the Court must draw are lines right in the
midst of a great struggle.46 They define the area of,contestability.47
They represent just where our intuitions about the separate domains give out. It is here the Court must do its work. But granting
all that, does it follow that the Court must do its work openly?
This may·sound like an odd question, but its answer is infected
with a related oddness. Why, we might ask, is the Court so clumsy?
Why, given a choice between two understandings of the public forum doctrine, does it pick the dumber of the two? There is an answer to this question, I suggest, and it resonates beyond simple
intelligence, or politics. The answer is tied to something we cannot
ignore about the institutional position of the Court. Think about
the rhetorical position of the Court executing each of the public
forum doctrine tests. In one test, the Court must articulate the relative strength of two highly contested values, and it then must decide
which value is more important than the other. In the other test, the
Court must report on whether a particular place is a "traditional
public forum." Which test is the easier of the two to apply? Not
easier in the sense of which is intellectually less difficult, but easier
in the sense of rhetorically less burdensome.
The answer to that depends upon the rhetorical costs for each
question, and what these are depends upon the institution in question. If it were a legislature confronting the question, there would
be relatively little cost in openly saying that it was resolving a conflict of values through its own majority vote. The same is not true
of a court. While it is to be expected that a legislature will confront
46. Cf. p. 14 ("The location of that boundary will no doubt be unstable and
contestable.").
47. This is not to say that all nonns are contestable, or even that they are "typically contestable." Seep. 183. I think it is a mistake to equate contestability with normativity. This is
at the core of RENFORD BAMBROUGH, MORAL SCEPTICISM AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE
(1979). It does not follow from the fact that a social meaning is a "political issue" that "like
... all political issues" it must be regarded as "indeterminate." P. 307. Social meanings, like
social norms, can be contestable or not, determinate or not, and in the main are far more
uncontested and determinate than we think.
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conflicting values, and expected that over time its resolution of that
conflict will change, it delegitimates the position of a court for it to
be seen openly to confront a conflict of values; it undermines its
institutional position for it to embrace a test for resolving such conflicts that can't help over time appearing to be merely the result of
politics. The social meaning of a legislature is politics; the social
meaning of a court is not.
What distinguishes the two public forum tests is just this difference in how each will make the Court appear. One test is truer to
First Amendment values, yet the Court's application of that test
would constitute a form of rhetorical self-immolation. The other
test is logically unrelated to the First Amendment values, yet it can
be applied in a way that preserves the Court's appearance of
neutrality.
This difference, I suggest, matters. It matters because in the selection of a test to enforce systematically constitutional values, the
Court can't help but consider its own institutional burden in applyfug this test. When the institutional burden is great, the Court will
select away from that test. When the institutional burden is slight,
the Court might select that test, even though its articulation, or
elaboration, of the constitutional value underlying the test is inferior to the elaboration of another test. Fidelity to constitutional
principle is just one value in the Court's collection of values, and we
have seen enough to know that at times it is sacrificed in the name
of an institutional interest.
What makes a test costly? It is not that the test involves "values" rather than facts. What matters is whether the value or facts
involved in the test are, in the present circumstance, contested, especially in ways that appear to reach outside the legal domain. It is
the contestedness of the terms of a test that render it costly for a
court to apply. For it is contestedness that makes it difficult for the
Court to apply the test in way that will seem consistent (p. 15). Inconsistency is the simplest signal that perhaps something other than
law is going on, and what the Court needs to do is to select tests
that rarely produce that signal.
We need to account for this dimension of constitutional practice
more fully than we do. It is a focus that has a long pedigree in
constitutional theory. Felix Frankfurter was an important exponent
of the concern;48 Robert Bork in our own day continues that obsession.49 But the reason for our focus on this dimension need not be
that we believe the questions that· are contested have no answers.
Contestedness is relevant, in other words, not because the domain
of the contested is subjective, or incapable of rational judgment.
48. See, e.g., FEux FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 22, 58 {1937).
49. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 26 {1978).
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That was Bork's view, but it is not mine. Contestedness is unrelated to the ontological status of the matter contested. We all, I am
sure, have views about abortion that we each believe true. Nonetheless, we all understand that views about abortion are contested.
The contestability might (read: should) make us a bit more humble
about the forcefulness with which we assert our views. But it
doesn't on its own undermine the judgment we might have that certain views are true, or not.
Contestedness is relevant to a court not because it identifies the
subjective, but because it mar}:cs out that space where, in the present
interpretive context, there is no clear link between (a) an authoritative legal text and (b) one or another view of a contested matter.
Reasonable people may differ, and in such a context, what the
Court wants first is a way to resolve the question without disagreeing with reasonable people. It wants, that is, a test that draws away
the political cost of one decision over the other.
What this should suggest, I want to argue~ is an institutional reason why we can observe these dunderheaded doctrines of constitutional law - doctrines that have no apparent connection with
underlying constitutional values, but that nonetheless seem to persist. The reason is this account of institutional cost. The Court, or
Justices on the Court, feel this cost just as they feel the cost of sexist
speech in their opinions, and change their opinions accordingly.
Contestedness has a kind of stigma associated with it, and these
well-socialized Justices avoid this stigma as they avoid stigmas of
every other kind.
Which brings us back to Post. For what all tJtls should suggest is
a certain incompleteness in the plan that Post presynts. It is no
doubt important, at the level of theory, to identify completely the
contours of constitutional doctrine. It is an advance to show, for
example, that there are three sides, not one. It is important, in articulating this theory, to show just how the theory fits with existing
practice. But that is just the first step of constitutional theory. For
theory must be translated into practice, and one unavoidable dimension of practice is this constraint on the tools the Court can
deploy. What an elegant theory of constitutional la'\,¥ needs is a
dunderheaded way to apply it. What it needs are tools of practice
that can be used to advance the constitutional values at issue without undermining the institutional position o~ the Co~rt.
It is not an answer to the dunderheads simply to say that the
Court should "struggle openly" ab0ut these values. Struggling
openly about constitutional values has a social meaning in this institutional context that, for a court, may be self-defeating. We might
question the social meaning, we might want it to be otherwise. But
a question and wish does not remake a social practice. It will take
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much more than rich theory to move our constitutional culture off
this debilitating skepticism.
B. What's Speech Got To Do with It?
It is easy for us, as lawyers, to think that law is terribly important.50 It is easier, as well-socialized sorts, to think that the sanction
of law is the only real sanction within our society. People don't get
condemned by the church much any more; dueling has apparently
died. So we are left, it may seem, with a world where the only limits
on our freedom are the limits set by the market and by the law. We
may think that beyond that, we are essentially free.
Part of Post's purpose in the first part of his book is to dislodge
just this view. At the core of his account is the community. But
community is, as Post describes, not where we live; it is instead a
form of life in part constituted by a structure of sanctions. If we
don't see community's sanctions because we have become so wellsocialized, then this is a function of blindness, and not nonexistence.
Our steps are guided as much by these social sanctions as by legal
sanctions; no doubt more. Quoting Sabina Lovibond, Post writes:
"[T]he norms implicit in a community's ... social practices are 'upheld,' in quite a material sense, by the sanctions which the community can bring to bear upon deviant individuals."51 One question
Post's account might raise is just what place this nonlegal structure
of sanctions should have in the law's account of the First
Amendment.
To answer this question, we should think a bit more generally
about community - about what it does, or what it provides, to the
individuals within it. Among the many things that a community
might provide are a class of things we might call collective goods.
Collective goods are goods that can benefit everyone in the community if anyone at all; and they are goods that no individual alone
would have a sufficient incentive to provide.52 I am not saying that
communities provide just collective goods; they also provide individual goods. But the class of goods that provides the greatest
trouble is the class of collective goods, and these are the focus
below.
To provide these collective goods, communities use sanctions.
Some sanctions are legal - the collective good of security from
violence is supported by criminal sanctions against violence. But
most sanctions are nonlegal; they get their force from mechanisms
50. This thought no doubt inspired Robert Ellickson's ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
SETILE DISPUTES (1991)
51. P. 147 (quoting SABINA LoVIBOND, REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS 61 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See Posner, supra note 20, at 137-42 (discussing collective goods).
NEIGHBORS
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outside the law. Attribution of bad reputation, or shaming, or exclusion - these are all the techniques of social sanction, all
deployed within a community to control, as much as possible, behavior within this community.53
The fact that such social sanctions are not "legal sanctions"
should not suggest that they are any less significant or forceful.
There is as much violence in ostracism as in a civil fine. Indeed, for
many the fear of social sanction is far more effective than the fear
of legal sanction. It is easier for me to imagine committing a felony
- well, some felonies - than it is for me to imagine crossing some
of the silliest social lines.54 Social sanctions and legal sanctions are
not ordered in some hierarchy of significance or force; there are
extremes on both sides of this line. Both work to· constrain individuals to contribute to the supply of collective goods.
These social mechanisms function in part through what we
might call the device of social meaning. By "social meaning" I
mean a name and a price given to an action, inaction, or status that
(a) in a particular community has a well-defined association
(whether positive, or negative, or neutral) and that (b) is internalized by a significant portion of the community with which the
meaning is a social meaning, such that people feel the appropriate
association when the social meaning is uttered.55 So, for example:
"not telling the truth" we call "lying." "Lying" has a social meaning
if (a) it has a well-defined association (here we would imagine negative) and (b) this association is to some degree internalized by people within our community, such that people ordinarily feel some
psychological cost if they lie and, all things being equal, they feel
the appropriate response to someone else lying. Or again: "throwing trash to the ground" we call "littering." "Littering" has a social
meaning if (a) there is a well-defined association with the act of
littering and (b) people have internalized that association both with
themselves and with others.
It should be clear that (a) and (b) don't necessarily run together.
Littering is a good example. There was a time when "littering" was
just becoming a social issue - when people started discussing its
53. This is the focus of the Chicago School. See Kahan, supra note 36; Cass Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. {forthcoming 1996).
54. See p. 75 (" 'The dread of public censure and disgrace is not only the most effectual,
and therefore the most important, but in numberless instances the only security which society
possesses for the preservation of decency and the performance of the private duties of life.' ")
(quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM
MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMORS xx-xxi (1826)).
55. For a more robust definition of social norms, see Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ennes 725, 751 (1990); see also Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge,
100 Ennes 862, 864 (1990). For a discussion of the difference between norms and meaning,
see Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996);
Sunstein, supra note 53.
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social cost - but when people still felt quite unabashed about littering. Eventually, the unabashedness disappeared. After extensive public campaigns, there was not only a clear association with
the act of littering (i.e., negative), but more and more, people had
internalized that association, such that they felt a cost when littering, and they felt negatively toward those who litter. The same
story might be told about smoking.56
When (a) and (b) do run together, however, the social meanings
they together de.fine function within that society selectively to reward or punish individuals who partake in that action, or inaction,
or status.57 They function, that is, to change the cost of different
behavior. If they change this cost efficiently, then they make the
benefit of a stigmatized action less then its cost, or, for a socially
desirable action, the benefit more than its cost. Social meanings,
that is, function here to supplement the individual cost or provide
an individual benefit, so as to induce the individual to behave in
one way or the other.
In this way then, some social meanings solve collective action
problems, and thereby help provide collective goods. If a clean environment is a collective good, but providing it presents a collective
action problem, then the stigma associated with littering can help
provide that collective good. The same can be said about lying .. If a
community within which trust exists is a collective good, then providing it presents a collective action problem. The stigma associated with lying helps impose a cost on individuals who deviate from
the norm of being truthful. Social meanings are semiotic tools for
regulating individual behavior, often to help induce individuals to
contribute to a collective good's supply.
Social meanings, then, are prices. They are just one of any
number of different prices that an action might incur. Battering
someone opens oneself up to the cost of criminal sanction; it also
opens oneself up to the cost of social sanction. Depending upon
who the person is, the costs of the latter could well exceed the costs
of the former. But regardless of the person, in most societies, the
action exacts both costs.
These structures might be said to constitute the techniques of a
community. They also lead us to focus on a central oddity in Post's
account. What Post's work does as well as any in First Amendment
thought is point to the extremely rich structure of social control that
any mature ~ociety has. His account of the civility norms highlights
just how a society depends upon the social mechanisms of control,
56. See SMOKING PouCY: LAw, Pouncs, AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen
D. Sugannan eds., 1993).
57. I discuss this at greater length in Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
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as well as legal mechanisms of control, and how both function together to sanction deviance within a particular community. His use
of material from sociology and anthropology points us to a very rich
literature that makes plain the place of each. The two combine to
help constrain individuals such that a particular kind of community
can be constructed. The state uses both legal and social sanctions to
achieve its ends, and it constructs both legal and social sanctions to
achieve its ends.
Against this background - against the background of an extremely rich array of techniques used by the state to achieve state
ends, some of which succeed by making actions stigmatizing or by
invoking existing structures of stigma to increase the costs of these
actions - just what the First Amendment is about begins to seem a
difficult question. There is the First Amendment of Barnette, with
its one "fixed star" - that in our constitutional constellation, "no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."58 But this plainly
is not our First Amendment. The state does not stick to legal sanctions; it uses social sanctions and legal sanctions interchangeably.
Indeed it sometimes prefers social sanctions, as these are likely to
be less expensive.59 Neither does it stic~ to existing social sanctions; it works to reformulate these social sanctions to make them
better serve state ends. Social sanctions function by establishing a
certain orthodoxy around a given behavior. The state uses this orthodoxy, it helps support it, it relies upon it, and it develops it.
Mucking around with what's right and wrong, good and bad, just
and unjust, is just one part of what the state does all the time.
Post should puzzle this more. For against this background,
there's something quite odd about the very particular, and quite
narrow, focus of the First Amendment's protections. Throughout
Post's account, the story we are told is that the First Amendment's
aim is to force the government to remain neutral among these differing conceptions of the good (p. 303), that the government remains neutral when it refuses to sanction, or punish - and here
legal sanction is what is meant - speech that deviates from some
reigning social orthodoxy.
But against the background I have just sketched, this focus
seems both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because if
the purpose of the First Amendment restrictions were really simply
to assure government neutrality in this marketplace of communities, then why may government muck around with the price of
membership in these various communities in all the other social58. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
59. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 630-52.
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meaning management ways that the government mucks around
with social meaning? Censorship through legal sanction is just one
technique of social-meaning management; it isn't even plain that it
is the most powerful technique. (Indeed, I believe a strong argument exists that in this society, it is one of the weakest techniques of
social-meaning management.) Given the range of techniques available for changing the price of various communities, limiting the
government's use of this s_ingle technique, while not considering at
all any of the other meaning-management techniques, is like
prohibiting murder by stabbing, but leaving unsanctioned any other
kind of killing.
The focus on sanctioning speech is too broad because if there
are indeed times when the government should muck around in the
market for communities, then it seems just arbitrary that this particular technique - sanctioning inappropriate speech - should be
picked out like this. Maybe some cases limiting censorship are
quite easy. Punishing criticism of the government, for example, is
an effective way to undermine the democratic processes, so a First
Amendment that protected criticism makes a great deal of sense.
But governmental secrecy is also a way to undermine the democratic process; yet there is no First Amendment bar to government
secrets. Even more so with governmental lies.Go In any case,
whatever push there is to ban censorship of governmental criticism,
it's not at all clear why that same push carries over to censorship of,
for example, pornography. Censorship of pornography might be
stupid, or self-defeating; but considering it the same as censorship
of antigovernmental speech is bizarre.
If what gets the First Amendment talk going is this focus on
neutrality - on this idea that the government somehow stands neutral in this "market" where individuals are asked to join, or defect
from, certain communities - then this debate makes sense only if
you are the sort who is blind to the ways in which social sanctions
are sanctions just as legal sanctions are, and blind to the ways in
which the state, consistent with the narrow First Amendment, uses
social sanctions all the time. If you believed that legal sanctions
were fundamentally different, if you believed that the state only
played a role through legal sanctions, if you believed that the effect
of legal sanctions was equal regardless of viewpoint, then you might
think that this anticensorship doctrine made sense.
60. Lying, for example, is what the government did to justify its atomic bombing of Japan.
See, e.g., GAR ALPEROVITZ, THE DECISION To USE TIIE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE ARCHITEC.
TURE OF AN AMERICAN MYIH 421-668 (1995). Yet lying as a challenge to government
speech is an underdeveloped constitutional domain. See MARK G. YuooF, WHEN GOVERN·
MENT SPEAKS: Pouncs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 6-10, 51-66
(1983); Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REv. 961 (1984).
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But Post can't believe this. Thus for him it should be a more
difficult question, just why the First Amendment doctrine is as narrow as it is. Put another way, if domains were really distinct, and if
governmental neutrality were really the objective, then it is not
clear why protecting speech in each domain is the way to secure
governmental neutrality. Maybe in the democracy domain, the government can't muck around with speech without undermining the
very purpose of democracy. But it is not clear why neutrality would
mean anticensorship in the community domain. As long as a right
of exit - even just dialngic exit - exi~ts, nothing yet shows why
communities can't censor. Censorship, within the community, is
just shaming by other means.
C.

Civility and Change

The government uses social meanings to advance its goals; it
acts to construct social meanings to advance its goals. All of this is
somehow off the First Amendment's screen. Though the focus of
the First Amendment is said to be neutrality, the effects of these
acts on free speech neutrality are ignored. This omission may be
forgivable. No one yet has made sense of this generality of governmental speech regulation.61 First Amendment focus has always
been on the narrower question of censorship. Why change now?
But even here there are questions to raise. We can see the point
by considering the limitations on the state's ability to enforce what
Post calls "civility rules." The common law, remember, had a relatively elaborate structure for enforcing rules of civility in speech
and !J.Ction; many of these rules have been eliminated by the First
Amendment. The government, the argument goes, must remain
neutral among perspectives; it remains neutral by denying to any
particular perspective the power of the state to enforce its view of
what is "civil." Instead, these are battles to be waged exclusively on
the social field, through voluntary actions at least at the level of
speech.
The picture here is essentially volunteerist. Communities get
built, this picture suggests, through the voluntary associations of individuals; individuals scan the field and enter the most attractive
clubs; and against this background, all the Constitution must do is
preserve a certain space for individuals to say their piece. Once
they say their piece, the communities they would endorse can construct themselves. But that they can say their piece, without fear of
governmental sanction, is all the Constitution must require.
61. The best accounts of the government speech question are: YuooF, supra note 60;
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
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Speech has the most important place in this account. It's not
that the individual must always be given a space to do whatever he
wants; only say (p. 190). Even more limited than that, what's required is that she be given a space where the state will not use its
power to punish her for saying whatever she wants to say, though of
course, others in the community may punish her for what she says
by disassociation, or scorn. All that the Constitution requires is
that one single lifeline of free speech be preserved - the constant
power to say, against the community, that a different way of living
should be adopted.
This lifeline translates into a space where the individual may be
"uncivil" - where the individual may fl.out the norms of the community, as a way to get the community to rethink its norms. The
picture here is of Robert Paul Cohen - a draft protester, stepping
outside society's terms of decency, as a way to highlight the indecency of that society.62 The idea is that by preserving this space for
individual dissent, by constitutionally protecting the right of the uncivil, we will protect this market in communities, always allowing a
deviant way to bid for a new society. The right to be uncivil, then,
is understood as a way to make society more transformative.
But this is not a complete account; the right to be uncivil is not
unambiguously a power to transform. The association is a mistake,
though we should be careful in excavating just what the mistake is.
Post's picture has two parts - one of the unencumbered individual simply selecting which community to join; and the second the
noble protester, protected by the First Amendment to stand outside
civility the better to gain the attention of the community-selecting
soul. We could question each, but I want to start with the second.
It should be a question whether - not an assumption that - all, or
most, or the most significant uncivil speech really functions like this.
For against the picture of Cohen we can place the picture of the
KKK - not the KKK marching in Skokie, but the KKK marching
in Selma. What is uncivil speech of the KKK in Selma, say, in 1954,
doing?
To answer this we should return to the account of social meaning sketched above. Recall that as well as solving collective action
problems, social meanings are themselves collective goods. They
require, to function, collective action, both in ascribing a certain
meaning to a certain action, and in behaving "appropriately" in response to that action. Enough must shun, or scorn, the person who
lies, or litters, for lying and littering to be social meanings; but this
act of shunning, or scorn, requires work. It takes the collective
62. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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work of many individuals. For a social meaning really to function
as a social meaning, we all, or most of us, must do something.
Put this way, we might begin to wonder, just how do these things
work anyway? If it takes effort, why do we see it? Why, especially
given that these goods, these social meanings, are themselves public
goods: if they exist for any, they exist for all. So if public goods,
why is it that people contribute to their supply? For we might imagine the forgiving sort - the person who, when confronted with be- ·
havior that has a negative social meaning, forgives the person who
has misbehaved.63 That person might reason like this: I agree that
the social meanings of our society are good ones, that they ought to
exist and ought to direct behavior; but they will exist whether or
not I contribute to their supply. If they don't exist, then my contribution won't make them exist; if they do exist, then my one noncontribution won't take them away. I can simply free ride off of
everyone else's contribution here. I can just forgive the person who
misbehaves.
Forgiveness might be its own virtue, and we might imagine cases
where people ought to forgive each other.64 But it is clear that if
everyone reasoned like our forgiving sort, pretty soon there
wouldn't be many social meanings that had any negative bite.
Something must induce the forgiving sort not always to forgive, but
sometimes to condemn, just as something must induce the indifferent sort not always to ignore socially good behavior, but sometimes
to praise. Something must induce them to contribute, that is, to the
construction of this social meaning, or else this social meaning will
no longer survive.
What induces individuals to contribute to the supply of a social
meaning is what we might think of as a second-level social meaning,
a social meaning about whether one should contribute to the supply
of a social meaning. For if there is a social meaning about improperly forgiving, then there is a cost suffered by an individual when he
or she improperly forgives. It is not just that individuals are to shun
those who violate social rules, but they are also to shun those who
fail to shun. Primary social meanings may direct how people ought
to behave; but secondary social meanings direct how people ought
to behave when others fail to behave.
It is here then that we can see the ambiguous role that uncivil
speech might play. Post's vision is that uncivil speech is a way to
help break up an existing community, that it is a bid for a different
63. This is not to say that forgiveness is improper. It is indeed sometimes proper; but the
point is that it can be improper as well. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993).
64. Perhaps the clearest case is forgiveness against one's own interest. Here at least, the
motives for forgiveness seem clearly to be something other than evading the social responsibilities of a particular social norm.
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community, and that this sort of bidding ought to be protected. But
uncivil speech could as well be, not a bid for a different community,
but a threat to help cement an existing community. If community is
just that place where social meanings exist, and if social meanings
exist only when supported by punishments, then what uncivil behavior might be is a way of punishing those who are beginning to
defect from the proper social meanings. Then uncivil speech functions to entrench, not disentrench, social meanings.
Think again about the ambiguity of uncivil speech by the KKK.
I describe for you the fact that the KKK has burned a cross on
someone's land. What is that action doing? Well, we might imagine two very different communities: one a community in the preCivil Rights Movement South - say, 1961 Selma; the second, Skokie. In the second community, I might - though with a big leap of
faith, I will confess - agree with Post about what this burning does.
It is a bid for a different community.65 A hateful, and thoroughly
discredited community, but a bid for a community where nonwhites, or non-Christians, or gays and lesbians, have a different social status just because of that fact. To protect uncivil speech in
Skokie might be a way to protect the right of some minority to say:
"Hey, America, let's try it this way." It might be Cohen, though an
extremely repulsive Cohen.
But this is not the function of the cross-burning in 1961 Selma.
Cross-burning in 1961 Selma is a way of reasserting a dominant social meaning of inequality. It is a way of reminding a swaying community of social meanings that already exist. It is a way of adding a
coercive force to those existing social meanings, to support them
when stigma is giving out. Here the function of the uncivil speech is
to entrench, not transform, an existing society. It is a bid to entrench that society by adding a threat of force behind the already
existing stigma associated with nonracist behavior. This threat
might fail, and our confidence that it will fail may lead us to ignore
it. But its function, and role, are different.
What is left out of Post's account is precisely this difference.
"Uncivil" speech has a role, but its role is not always to bid for a
different community. And the same point can be made about his
treatment of the meaning of state intervention to suppress uncivil
speech. This too can be ambiguous, but Post treats it as unitary.
Post's picture is again Cohen - the police arresting Cohen, or Bull
Connor's dogs in Birmingham. Again, the state's intervention
means the suppression of dissent, a way for the majority to achieve
dominance over this dissent.
65. See Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of
America, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 87 (1994) (discussing whether racist speech makes a contribution to public dialogue).
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But what of Eisenhower's troops in Little Rock? Or the federal
troops resisting George Wallace at the University of Alabama?
Here the meaning of the state's intervention is quite different. The
meaning is about the validation of one fundamental value - equality - rather than the suppression of another - free speech. It is
not about supporting a dominant view; it's about protecting a minority's interest.
These examples underline the differences in meaning that state
action can have. Sometimes entrenching of the status quo; sometimes disentrenching. This difference Post doesn't account.66 But it
might seem that this does not undermine Post's basic point - the
claim that the government must remain neutral in this marketplace
of community-building (p. 138). Even if it is true, that is, that sometimes uncivil speech is directed at preserving the status quo, and
that sometimes uncivil speech is directed at transforming it, the
state, in allowing all such uncivil speech, is remaining neutral between preserving and transforming social contexts (p. 10).
There is this formal neutrality. But we should think a bit more
before we conclude that in substance, the laissez-faire is also the
neutral. For imagine a well-socialized community, where social
norms are fully internalized by members of that community. Then
think about the difference in the difficulty between making two
kinds of changes to this community. One is the change of transformation when some individual or some group decides it wants to
change some part of the social norms of that community. The other
is the change of preservation when some individual or some group
decides it. wants to preserve some social norms. Formally, of
course, both groups face the same challenge. Both must convince a
significant portion of the community to follow them if either is to
prevail. But the difference between them is in background mechanisms that support, or resist, the change in each. For what it means
to say that a community is well-socialized is just that when individuals begin to defect from the dominant social norms, other social
norms intervene to punish them. When an individual begins to act
against the dominant norms of the community, other members of
the community are to act against that defection, and if they don't
act, then others are to act against them for failing to enforce social
norms. The act of defecting is costly; and this is a cost built into the
very idea of social norms.
Thus when individuals, or groups, act against a prevailing social
norm, all things being equal, they suffer a burden that is greater
66. Post does distinguish the rule's being the expression of the general view from its being
the expression of a view "hegemonically imposed by one dominant cultural group onto
others," but he hasn't distinguished the role of a rule that expresses a general view or a
hegemonic view from one expressing a just view rightfully imposed. P. 67.
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than the burden of someone acting to sustain a social norm. For
when someone acts to sustain a social norm, the norms of loyalty
reward that person. But when someone act to change a social
norm, the norms of loyalty punish him. The cost, therefore, of
transformation, all things being equal, is greater than the cost of
preservation.
Allowing uncivil speech, then, is a way for the state to ratify this
difference in the costs of transformation and preservation. Indeed,
it might be worse than that. It might be that the benefit of uncivil
speech is greater for the preservationists than the transformationists, though of course this is an empirical question. Empirics
notwithstanding, it is quite plausible - indeed, it is the history of
our country - that the uncivil speech is more effective in frightening people into the status quo than it is in shocking them out of the
status quo. The free speech dissident is a romantic figure in constitutional lore, but his actions were probably not as effective as the
threats of the norm-enforcers in the South.
Thus there is this background against which this formal neutrality that Post describes must be evaluated. While the state may be
formally neutral when it refuses to punish uncivil speech that is
transformative as well as uncivil speech that is preservative, the effect of this neutrality may be quite different between these two
objectives. Uncivil speech is more likely the tool of choice for status-quo-preserving social norms than it is for status-quo-transforming social norms; and hence the effect of protecting uncivil speech is
to further burden the efforts at transformation. Formal neutrality
notwithstanding, the effect of this rule is further to preserve the status quo.
Now I am the last person who can complain that Post's account
here is too simple, not sensitive enough to a difference in the kinds
of uncivil speech that there are. Given my complaint above about
borders, it is of course an unbelievably difficult task to distinguish
the transformative from the entrenching. No dunderhead rule
could describe it, and I am not convinced that in the abstract the
difference should matter. Indeed, one need not be a pure Burkian
to understand that there are lots of good reasons why the status quo
should be difficult to change. Or at least we can identify aspects of
the status quo that we would want to make difficult to change. We
can neither criticize in the abstract the difficulty of changing the
status quo, nor can we identify a clear rule that would help distinguish status-quo-preserving from status-quo-transforming speech.
Nonetheless, there are two points that I think are important that
might come from this point about the difference between transforming and preserving speech. The first is about constitutional law
generally. If the experience of post-Communist constitutionalism
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has taught us anything, it has taught us that this difference is a
source of an important gap in constitutional theory. For ordinarily
we think of a constitution as an entrenching device. We think, that
is, that what a constitution is to do is entrench a certain way of
being. The image is of Ulysses and the mast: the idea is that we
need a constitution to bind us to our most important values; we
need a way to restrict ourselves from doing what in our more reflective mode we believe we shouldn't do.
But this is not all that a constitution does. For sometimes a constitution is designed not so much to preserve the status quo, as to
change it. Sometimes it is designed not to entrench a certain way of
being, but to dislodge it. This, for example, is what constitutionalism in post-Communist Europe is about. The constitutions in postCommunist Europe are not designed to entrench a certain social
order, or way of being; they are designed to change an order or way
of being. Their aim is to remake a social order, to change patterns
of thought constructed by fifty or seventy years of communism, and
to change these habits of the heart into patterns that would support
constitutionalism. How this is done is an extremely difficult question, but from what I've said so far, it should be clear just what sort
of question it is. For this effort at constitutionalism in post-communist Europe is an effort at transforming something about the social
order in post-Communist Europe. It is an effort at changing the
social meaning of various institutions in the post-Communist democracies, not an effort at entrenching certain institutions.
What should be obvious is that the techniques of this transformative constitutionalism are not necessarily the same techniques as
the techniques of codifying constitutionalism. How a constitution
codifies certain practices of social life may well be different from
how it sets up the conditions for changing them. More importantly,
techniques for codifying practices of social life may well make impossible techniques for changing them.
Constitutionalism in general hasn't thought enough about the
differences between these two kinds of constitutionalism, nor
enough about how to integrate them. Post's approach here, like
constitutionalism generally, is not sensitive to the differences that
transformative constitutionalism might make.67 While this fault, if
it is a fault, doesn't distinguish him relative to other constitutionalists, it does matter, I want to suggest, to his own account in one
extremely significant way.
67. This is not to say that Post doesn't see the difference at all. He is sensitive to the
common law's objective as either to "shape and alter social norms" or to "maintain social
norms," but he is quick to see the codifying as the "rationale" of the law, and leave aside the
possibility of a transformative r~tionale. P. 65.
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This is the second point that might follow about the difference
between transformative and preserving speech, and it ties most directly to what is, in my view, the weakest chapter of the book - the
last, the "reprise." Here Post addresses what is for us one of the
most difficult First Amendment problems - hate speech. His approach is extremely careful, and sensitive, and conditional: he has
no firm conclusion about whether hate speech should be regulated,
because he fully well understands the strongest reason to regulate
such speech. This is the concern that a history of racism has destroyed the preconditions for responsive democracy (pp. 320-21).
A significant segment of society, whether defined on racial or gender lines, is alienated from the dominant discourse of American democracy. This alienation makes it impossible for these Americans
to participate on equal terms within a responsive democracy.68 If
that is so, then it might well be proper "to take steps to eliminate this
alienation, even if these steps are inconsistent with the individualist
principles of the American First Amendment tradition.
Post has not written a brief, and that's the beauty of the book.
One feels the struggle in his thought as he works through the problem. But something is missing from the account. As he fully well
acknowledges that a compromise in these First Amendment principles might be necessary, he simultaneously speaks as if this compromise would be a profound loss. If we narrowed the range of
possible communities that the Constitution allows us to select
among, this would be a loss of great constitutional moment. The
writing makes one feel as if integrity is on the line; that we will
forever be marked as compromised, or fallen, if we take steps to
close off certain communities from the possible communities that
American democracy might select among.
But when one asks just what we would lose, this pathos begins
to fade. I understand what it means to say we would lose something
if communitarians weren't free to try to sell the life of community,
or if Republicans weren't free to try to sell the life of the Contract,
or if Baptists weren't free to try to sell the life of Christianity. I
understand that loss, even though I could never imagine myself a
communitarian, or Republican, or Baptist. When I think of these
groups, of the world they want to construct, I am angry, or frustrated, or antagonistic; but I understand the importance of keeping
space open for these visions, and this passion.
But when I think of the community the KKK wants me to imagine, none of that tolerant fuzziness remains. I confess, I really don't
see what we lose by giving up the option of the political community
68. See p. 119 ("[P]ublic deliberation cannot achieve its purposes if it is 'considered or
experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom.' ")
(quoting Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1527 (1988)).
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that the KKK wants us to embrace. I don't see what we lose, because I think we've seen enough in this debate.
A comparative might make the point more strongly. Germany
is a mature constitutional democracy; indeed, I would suggest, more
mature in some ways than our own. They have a free speech principle that has functioned effectively to limit the government's ability
to regulate speech. But it is a principle that has an important exception: Germany thinks of itself as a "militant democracy," which
means it believes it must not only assure democracy, but assure the
conditions of democracy. 69 It rejects the idea that a "spontaneous
ordering" (p. 194) will assure that the conditions for democratic
thought will exist, or survive, on its own. It doesn't believe in the
invisible hand when applied to the conditions of democracy. Instead, the German constitution is explicitly directed against certain
views of the community that are inconsistent with principles Germany declares that it holds fundamental. Those views of the community have been taken off the table in· Germany. Nazism in
particular is not a permissible form of life in Germany; it is not an
option under the German constitution. That is not to say that Germany will never embrace fascism again; it is just to say that if it
does, it will not be under the existing constitutional regime.
One might look at this narrowing of the political options under
the German regime and regret it. One might think, that is, that
some principle of democracy has been lost by this limitation. That
the "logic" of democracy, or free speech, has been violated. But
again, I can't muster that thought. It seems to me perfectly just,
and eminently rational, for Germany to say to itself, and commit to
itself, that it rejects this form of community. It seems to me perfectly just, not because in general I think putting a form of community off the table makes sense, but because I know something maybe not much, but something - about recent German history.
Against this background, it seems to me perfectly just for Germany
to promise itself, and the world, that that nation it will never again
be.
That promise is a form of transformative constitutionalism.70 It
is a technique for identifying a pathology in the existing social structures of a constitutional democracy, and for taking steps to eliminate those structures. It is a kind of therapy, which works to
undermine the pathology identified. It is about making the nation
something other than it was.
69. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
213-27 (1994) {describing the principle of "militant democracy").
70. The approach is explored in Run
1997).

G. TEITEL, TRANsmoNAL JusncE
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This goal of Germany, to eliminate the fascist in its soul, is a
good one. The only question one might have is whether the means
chosen to that end are effective. The end justifies the means (what
else would justify the means?), and the end of becoming a Kantian
nation seems to me, for Germany, perfectly just.
Germany is more than an example. One might think that we
too have had a transformative moment in our own constitutional
history. That was the Fourteenth Amendment. One might, that is,
understand the Fourteenth Amendment to be a similar self-acknowledgment of a pathology in the American soul.71 One might
then understand it as an effort in transformative constitutionalism.
To the extent that it identifies a particular kind of transformation
that we as a nation have committed ourselves to, it represents as
well a reason to think differently about constitutional principle as it
relates to this chosen therapy. It gives us a reason, that is, to understand the regulation of hate speech not as we understand the regulation of speech about communism, or anarchism, or
republicanism,72 but rather to understand the question of hate
speech the way Germany understands the question of fascism.7 3
I understa~d that this is inconsistent with some high principle of
liberalism. I suspect that the ACLU would not be proud of this
weakness of will in a card-carrying member of that organization.
But I understand the ACLU's disappointment to be because the
ACLU's conception of the First Amendmertt is just the conception
that Post is attacking. Its conception is that the principles it identifies must be carried everywhere in just the same way, or else something has been compromised. Its conception is that there is one
free speech principle, and its crusade is to extend it to as many
places as possible.
That isn't Post's view, and it is not mine either. The First
Amendment should extend in ways consistent with just social understandings of widely different domains. It should extend so as to
give individual and democratic space. It should extend to construct
a certain life. But I no more understand why it must extend to all
sorts of hate than I understand why it must extend to the President's press secretary's right to disagree with the President. I don't
understand, that is, why, as a matter of principle, we could not self71. This is the argument of Kenneth Karst, pointed to by Post. See p. 305; Kenneth L.
Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1988).
72. These three domains of speech have, of course, all been historically regulated. See,
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925) (anarchism); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964)
(discussing Sedition Act of 1798).
73. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992).
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consciously decide that the principle must be limited, if the social
meaning of equality is to be achieved.
We might, of course, not have so decided. We might not have
decided collectively, in a proper way, that equality norms should
inform, or alter, speech norms. Or it might just be that limiting
speech is a stupid way to bring about this equality.74 We have
learned a lot recently about that question. I never would have
thought, for example, that someone would say that in America in
1995, the harm of being discriminated against because one is a
white male is the same as that of being discriminated against because one is black. Nonetheless, people say this, and many believe
it, and it might just be the deep pathology of American racism that
this kind of belief cannot be ignored. That all might be. But that it
seems to me is an empirical question, not a matter of first (amendment) principle. Which means that we should be thinking about
how we integrate this transformative ideal into our constitutional
regime, not how we ignore it.
That we ignore it should be plain. The Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than stap.ding for this principle of transformation, is slowly
becoming the charter of the status quo;75 rather than especially empowering Congress to act to transform the status quo, to remake
the society and social meanings that one might think pathological, it
is quickly becoming the· principle that says that any effort at remaking the status quo is unconstitutional. Rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment modifying the First, the First has modified the
Fourteenth.
Unitary constitutionalism will not see these points differently.
Unitary constitutionalism will understand all effort to regulate
speech the same way. What is surprising about Post here is that
while he is not unitarian about domains, he is a unitarian about
purpose. There is a principle to keep as much on the table as possible; this, he suggests, is the principle of democracy. One hundred
and thirty years after the Civil War, one wants to know just why.
D. Federalism and Community
There's a picture of America at the founding, somewhat naive,
fundamentally crude, but useful nonetheless. The picture is something like this: America at the Founding was composed of small
towns, villages really, that peppered a vast expanse of territory.
The largest city at the Founding was New York. Its population was
74. See Shiffrin, supra note 65, at 102-03.
75. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. a. 2097 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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50,000.76 The distance between the nation's two largest cities, New
York and Philadelphia, was ninety miles. That took several days to
travel. America at the founding was like imagining a nation today
composed of the nations of Switzerland, Georgia, Russia, and
Japan.
This fact of relative isolation mattered. It mattered because it
aligned "what was possible" with "what was desirable." We think
of the Framers as having chosen a relatively decentralized federalist
structure; but it is not clear just what more they could have done.
In a world as decentralized as the framing world was, it was not just
undesirable to centralize authority in the federal government; more
importantly, it was just unfeasible.
A similar coincidence - of the feasible and with the desirable
- touches this issue of community. In the sense that Post means
community, community at the founding was local, and geographical. "Connectedness" was local - one knew, and worked, and socialized, and struggled with people nearby, because anything else
was impossible. There were dimensions along which people were
within the "national" community, but not many.
This fact fits with, and makes sense of, the original division of
legislative jurisdiction, and constitutional right. For again, at the
local level, communities had the power to regulate broadly, in ways
that would be constitutive of a certain kind of community, while at
the national level not. At the national level the Constitution limited the feqeral government in ways it did not at the local level.
The First Amendment, in particular, limited the federal government, and not the states.
The difficulty for American constitutionalism, then, is that this
fundamental fact of the framing context - this relative isolation has changed, and it is the fundamental challenge of American constitutional interpretation to accommodate this change. Whether desirable or not, it is now feasible to regulate most everything at the
national level; whether desirable or not, it is less feasible to constitute communities by regulating at the local level. The challenge for
constitutionalism is how to account for this change, while preserving something of the framing balance.
The change is fundamental for the concerns that Post raises. For
if "community," in the sense that Post means, fit the reality of a
local political community - when, in other words, connectedness
was local, and hence community was geography - then it made
sense to grant the local political community special status in its
power to regulate individuals within its jurisdiction. But to the extent that local political communities have no real connection with
76. See DONAlD B. DODD, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE STATES OF TIIE UNITED
STATES

454 (1993).
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"community" - to the extent that connectedness is no longer geographic - it makes less and less sense to grant the local political
community special status in its power to regulate individuals within
its jurisdiction. Lincoln may have been from Illinois, but Illinois is
just where I live.
The history of American constitutionalism is in part the history
of this accommodation - the accommodation to this changing
predicate of isolation. In the powers context, the change has extended federal power broadly, with limited efforts to rein it back
in.77 In the First Amendment context, the response has been to
treat all governments like the federal government. Even if the
framing understanding allowed a wider range of democratic control
at the local level over the nature and construction of community~
what incorporation has come to mean is that government at the local level is no different from government at the national level.
There is one First Amendment, and it applies without distinction
from the highest to localist levels of government.
This has meant a certain confusion. For it is not as if this one
First Amendment applies so as to force the government to be neutral - in the sense of not affecting which outcome, or which community, prevails - at either the national or local level. As I said
above, the government is limited in its power to censor, but one can
muck around with a speech or a community market in more ways
than censorship. Nor is it as if this one First Amendment successfully channeled traditionally local speech regulation to the local
level, and national speech regulation to the national level. This is
an era when those most forcefully pressing "states' rights" are also
those most eager that the national government promote "family
values. "78
The real change in the constitutional landscape brought about
by these shifts is the shift between public and private regulation of
speech. Of course no strong limitation on the power of localities to
regulate speech existed at the Founding; local democracies could
then constitute communities as they saw fit. While the First
Amendment now would reach these goveriunental efforts at the
construction of community, most such construction is now private,
and hence without the reach of the First Amendment. Hence, from
one perspective, one might believe that the existing constitutional
regime is in effect equivalent to the original, since, as with the original, the locus of community-building is outside the scope of the
First Amendment.
77. I develop this idea in the context of federalism in Translating Federalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. Cr. REv. 125.
78. See, e.g., CoNTRAcr WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
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The difference, of course, is that this new locus of communitybuilding is also outside the scope of democratic control. It is private, not public, and hence free from both constitutional constraint
and democratic constraint. Not that the original regime could be
thought fundamentally democratic; its democracy was of course
quite flawed. But clearly the new regime disables democratic efforts in reconstructing community, at least so far as they employ
certain proscribed First Amendment means.
One might have thought this result inevitable; that there would
be no way for incorporation to extend the limits of the First
Amendment outside the reach of government, and hence the consequence that most regulation of speech is private and outside the
~cope of the First Amendment was, in some important sense, unavoidable. But as Richard Ford has well argued, as a historical matter, this was in no sense obvious, or compelled.79 For originally,
"corporations," whether commercial or municipal, were the same
sort of creature; both equally the construction of government; both
equally subject to whatever limitations extended to government.
Given this common origin, what begs explanation is just why one of
these original "corporations" is considered a state actor, and the
other not.
This is not the place to resolve these oddities. But what they,
and the federalist structure they result from, suggest, along with the
account that Post offers, are a few uncomfortable thoughts that will
not resolve themselves easily within this constitutional regime. The
first thought is that speech regulation, or as I would call it, socialmeaning regulation, has been a permanent feature of social and
political life; all that has changed is the locus of that regulation. To
the extent that the framing regime endorsed a decentralized and
local form of social-meaning regulation, that value of federalism
might be one that continues to inform the decision about who
should have this power of regulation. But the uncomfortable fact is
that it is a decision, not compelled by the original structure, and not
well-executed in the existing regime. From a federalist perspective,
one may well believe that too much of this social-meaning regulation goes on at the federal level, and that too little goes on at a level
corresponding to the connectedness of the community. Likewise,
to the extent that there is regulation at the level of the community,
one might well question the extent to which this is regulation
outside democratic control.
The difficult question for the present constitutional regime is
just why self-conscious efforts by democratically responsible agents
to redefine social meaning are constitutionally problematic, while
79. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1879-80 (1994).
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self-conscious efforts by agents democratically irresponsible to
redefine social meaning are not. Why is it that when you add democracy into the bargain the mix turns sour, but when the market is
the bargain, the mix is perfectly sweet?
CONCLUSION

There's no single principle of free speech; there are a collection
of understandings. This collection is not expressible in any single
phrase; it is instead like a code, applying differently in separate
spheres of social life. This collection of principles is who we are they are for the most part invisible; they for the most part function
invisibly; and they for the most part limit governmental action in
ways plainly understood. Yet despite this collection of understandings, despite this multiplicity, despite this invisibility, constitutional
law insists on a single vision. It insists on a single principle that
might make this social understanding appear like law, on a principle
that might make it function like law - like a simple constitutional
text, with determined directness. It is understandable why constitutional law so seeks. For if it is to function to constrain, if it is to
have the capacity to impose on others, if it is to impose this principle through the tools of courts, then this simplicity, this directness,
is just what constitutional law needs. It needs, that is, a way to deny
the complexity that it also is.
The power of Post's book is that it compels us to see the complexities of First Amendment life - it compels us to see, that is, the
divergent modalities of free speech regulation. The free speech
principle that makes most sense of who we are is one that applies
differently in these different domains; it is one that can limit itself
according to these different domains. What we need then is some
tool for tracking these domains, and selecting a body of principles
based on these domains. Interestingly, perhaps accidentally, the
framing structure gave us something of this. It left the places of
community free to regulate, while limiting governmental power in
the places that were not community. But that structure rested, we
might say, upon a fact of isolation; and as that fact of isolation has
disappeared, this structure could no longer be sustained. The frictions of social life before kept separate these different domains of
regulation, and as these frictions have disappeared, this separation
has disappeared as well.
What is needed, then, is a new tool for keeping separate the
regulation of these different domains. As Meir Dan-Cohen might
say, what is needed is a device for keeping acoustically separate the
regulation of these different domains, so that the rules of one need
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not necessarily be relied upon in the other, so that the optimal mix
of rules for both might be obtained.so
It might be that the clumsiness, or crudeness, of current First
Amendment doctrine is just such a device. 81 But to know that
would require much more analysis. What we can say is that it is not
obvious that the solution to the current clumsiness is simply to be
more open about the conflict of values that these separate domains
might entail. Transparency is a solution only if the transparent institution can deal openly and effectively with the conflict that transparency reveals. But this is not what this Court, or this judiciary,
can do. We have been shown that the problem is more complex
than the doctrine pretends; we have not been shown that it is not
too complex for this legal culture to handle.

80. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
81. This may be the best implication to be drawn from Elena Kagan's account of the
motivating purpose behind First Amendment policy generally. Her argument is that an effort
to screen improper governmental intent is behind much of First Amendment doctrine, even
though none of the First Amendment doctrines directly pursue this end. The doctrines then
may be the necessarily indirect devices for pursuing this end that could not be pursued directly. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).

